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A just claim?
Can a trustee in bankruptcy be entitled to claim an occupation
rent from an occupying co-owner? Mark Pawlowski investigates
‘Pre-1996 case law tended
to award an occupation
rent as a matter of course
in cases where there had
been a breakdown of the
relationship and one party
had left the joint home
with no prospect of return.’
Mark Pawlowski is a 
barrister and professor 
of property law at the
University of Greenwich
PROPERTY
T
he modern law of equitable
accounting makes clear that the
payment of an occupation rent
(essentially, compensation for the loss of
the benefit of being able to live in jointly
owned property) is no longer dependent
upon the requirement of an ouster by
the occupying co-owner. The obligation
to make such payment is now based pri-
marily on an application of the statutory
criteria set out in the Trusts of Land and
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (the
1996 Act). Only where the Act is not
applicable will the court resort to its
equitable jurisdiction of ordering an
occupation rent so as to do ‘broad 
justice’ between the parties.
This was the approach taken by
Blackburne J in the recent case of French
v Barcham [2008], which involved a claim
for an occupation rent by the husband’s
trustee in bankruptcy. The case forms
the basis of this article.
Statutory background
Section 13(3) of the 1996 Act gives 
co-owners (as trustees of land) the
power to impose reasonable conditions
on the occupier, including the payment
of outgoings or expenses in respect 
of the land and compensation to a 
person whose right to occupy has been
excluded or restricted (s13(5) and (6)). In
addition, the court has wide powers
(under s14) to make a variety of orders
in relation to the exercise by the trustees
of any of their functions including
declaring the nature or extent of a
person’s interest, having regard to a
number of factors, which are listed in
s15(1). These include: 
• the intentions of the persons who
created the trust; 
• the purpose for which the property
is held; 
• the welfare of any children occupy-
ing the property; and 
• the interests of any secured creditor
or any beneficiary. 
The upshot of this is that the court is 
no longer concerned only with consider-
ations relevant to achieving justice
between the parties (as under the pre-
1996 case law), but must consider (in
achieving a just result) the various criteria
set out in s15.
Application of statutory criteria
It is against this statutory background
that brief mention may be made of Stack
v Dowden [2007] and Murphy v Gooch
[2007] (for more on which, see my earlier
article in FLJ69, p12). It will be recalled
that in Stack the majority of the House of
Lords refused to grant an order requir-
ing Miss Dowden to pay her outgoing
partner (Mr Stack) an occupation rent on
the ground that her children needed to
remain in the family home until the
property was sold. She had the conduct
of the sale and there was no suggestion
that she was delaying this or otherwise
acting obstructively. 
In Murphy, which again involved an
unmarried couple, Lightman J held that
Miss Murphy’s claim for an occupation
rent was not barred simply because she
was not excluded from the home by her
former partner. The principle was that
the court could order credit for occupa-
tion rent if it was just to do so regardless
of whether there was proof of ouster.
Applying the statutory criteria set out in
s15 of the 1996 Act, his Lordship ordered
that Miss Murphy was entitled to a set
off (by way of an occupation rent)
against all the costs, expenses and out-
goings met by Mr Gooch during the
whole period of his sole occupation of
the parties’ former home. 
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Most recently, in Rahnema v Ansari
[2008] the court, applying Murphy,
ordered the payment of an occupation
rent by the former wife (who remained
in the property with her mother) in order
to do ‘broad justice between the parties’.
Interestingly, both parties accepted in
this case that the criteria set out in s15 of
the 1996 Act had no significance to the
facts, so the court was inevitably thrown
back on its equitable jurisdiction to do
what was just in the circumstances.
Significantly, all three cases illustrate
the trend of the earlier (pre-1996) case
law of awarding an occupation rent as a
matter of course in cases where there
had been a breakdown of the relation-
ship and one party had (for all practical
purposes) left the joint home with no
prospect of return, leaving the other 
co-owner in sole occupation thereof. 
Earlier cases
Do the same principles apply where the
applicant is not a former partner or
spouse but a trustee in bankruptcy acting
on behalf of the non-occupying owner?
The case law prior to the 1996 Act sug-
gested that the more relaxed approach
towards charging an occupation rent
between parties also applied in the spe-
cific context of a partner’s bankruptcy. 
Thus in Re Byford [2003] the court
ordered the payment of an occupation
rent in favour of the husband’s trustee 
in bankruptcy despite there being no 
marriage breakdown or ouster.
Lawrence Collins J held that it was
enough that the trustee in bankruptcy
could not reside in the property or derive
any financial benefit from it while the
wife remained in occupation. Although
the trustee could have exercised his
remedies (eg of sale) earlier, the fact that
he had not done so benefited the wife
considerably by allowing her to have
continued use of the property with her
husband. His Lordship said:
What the court is endeavouring to do 
is broad justice or equity as between 
co-owners… [The] fact that there has not
been an ouster or forcible exclusion is
not conclusive.
Significantly, although there was
nothing to prevent the trustee from
applying to realise the property, this did
not alter the fact that, from a realistic
point of view, he could not occupy the
premises himself. 
The French case
Despite the fact that the ruling in 
Re Byford, above, has been criticised 
academically as extending equitable
accounting to ‘a virtual presumption
that equity requires the payment of
occupation rent to a trustee in bank-
ruptcy’ (see N Berry, (2005) NLJ 486, at
487) the continuing judicial trend is to
allow the trustee to charge an occupa-
tion rent on the basis that they cannot
reasonably be expected to exercise a
right of occupation while the other 
beneficiary remains in residence. 
In French the family home (compris-
ing a semi-detached bungalow) had
been acquired by the parties as beneficial 
tenants in common in equal shares.
Following the husband’s bankruptcy, his
equitable share vested in his trustee in
bankruptcy who (some 12 years later)
applied to the court for an order for sale
of the home. The primary issue was
whether the trustee was entitled to set off
against the wife’s claim for outgoings on
the property a sum for her occupation of
the premises since her husband’s bank-
ruptcy. The problem was that the trustee
was not a beneficiary who was entitled
to occupy land within the meaning of s12
of the 1996 Act and, therefore, was not
eligible to any compensation under
s13(6) of the Act. 
In Blackburne J’s view, there was a
short answer to this problem. The 1996
Act did not provide an exhaustive regime
for compensation for the exclusion of a
In Stack v Dowden the majority of the House of Lords
refused to grant an order requiring Miss Dowden to
pay her outgoing partner an occupation rent.
Re Byford
[2003] EWHC 1267 (Ch)
Dennis v McDonald
[1982] Fam 63
French v Barcham
[2008] EWHC 1505 (Ch)
Murphy v Gooch
[2007] EWCA 603
Re Pavlou
[1993] 1 WLR 1046
Rahnema v Ansari
(Unreported, 20 March 2008)
Stack v Dowden
[2007] UKHL 17
WTLR has grown to become the leading set of law reports for the trust and probate
practitioner. The editorial board of leading practitioners aims to ensure that all decisions
which affect the advice you give are identified and reported – in one place.
Published ten times a year, WTLR focuses primarily on UK decisions. However, key
offshore judgments are also reported. And, unlike other reports, older, unreported
judgments which have an important bearing on the law today are reported, ensuring
that all readers are aware of their existence.
The specialist set of law reports for the specialist practitioner
Wills & Trusts LAW REPORTS
To subscribe today call 020 7396 9313 or visit www.legalease.co.uk
FLJ79 p18-20 Pawlowski  22/8/08  17:05  Page 19
September 200820 Family Law Journal 
PROPERTY
As to the applicability of the doctrine
of equitable accounting where the claim
for an occupation rent is brought by a
trustee in bankruptcy, the ruling in French
reiterates the current judicial trend of not
insisting strictly on an ouster to justify an
entitlement to equitable compensation. In
Dennis v McDonald [1982], Purchas J con-
cluded that the occupying co-owner
would only be free of any liability to pay
an occupation rent if the outgoing owner
was in a position to enjoy the right to
occupy but voluntarily chose not to do
so. This approach was followed in Re
Pavlou [1993], where Millett J felt that, 
in the context of a matrimonial home
where the relationship had ended, the
party who leaves will, in most cases, 
be regarded as excluded from the home.
But again, even in this context, if the 
outgoing partner leaves voluntarily 
and would be welcome back so as to
enjoy their right to occupy, then it would
not be equitable to demand an occupa-
tion rent. Similarly now in French,
Blackburne J has expressed a view that:
… if there is some reason why [a] co-
owner is not in occupation and it would
be unreasonable in the circumstances for
him to take up occupation fairness
requires the occupying co-owner to com-
pensate the other for the fact that the
one has enjoyment of the property while
the other does not.
It seems, therefore, that the previous
concept of ‘ouster’ has now given way
to a wider notion of ‘reasonableness of
occupation’ – the question now is
whether, in all the circumstances, it is
reasonable for the non-occupying owner
to exercise their right as a co-owner to
take up occupation of the property. This
move away from a narrow concept of
exclusion is to be welcomed as provid-
ing an important element of flexibility
(as illustrated by French itself) in award-
ing equitable compensation in cases
which, strictly speaking, fall outside the
statutory ambit of the 1996 Act. ■
beneficiary from occupation of property
held subject to a trust of land. In his
Lordship’s words:
Where the scheme applies, it must be
applied. But where it plainly does not I do
not see why the party who is not in 
occupation of the land in question
should be denied any compensation at all
if recourse to the court’s equitable juris-
diction would justly compensate him.
The statutory power to award com-
pensation (under s13(6)) was only
exercisable as a condition to be imposed
on the occupying beneficiary in relation to
their occupation of the property in ques-
tion. An essential prerequisite here was
the entitlement (under s12) of the benefi-
ciary claiming compensation to occupy
the property at any time by reason of that
interest. In other words, what triggered
the award of compensation was the exclu-
sion or restriction of that interest. A
trustee in bankruptcy, on the other hand,
had no right of occupation and so there
was no scope for the operation of s13.
Although there was not entitlement
under the 1996 Act, this did not, how-
ever, preclude the trustee from charging
the wife an occupation rent under the
court’s equitable jurisdiction. The gov-
erning principle here was that, if there
was some reason why the co-owner was
not in occupation and it would be unrea-
sonable (from a practical point of view)
to expect that co-owner to take occupa-
tion of the property, it would normally
be fair and equitable to charge the occu-
pying owner an occupation rent. In the
instant case, it was not reasonable to
expect the trustee in bankruptcy to exer-
cise his right of occupation and,
consequently, it was proper to order the
payment of compensation. The result
was that, on a sale of the home, the
wife’s half-share in the property would
be reduced by a sum equal to one-half of
the land’s letting value from the time of
the husband’s bankruptcy.
Exceptions
In French Blackburne J suggested that
there may be circumstances in which the
payment of an occupation rent would
not be justified. For example, the occu-
pying co-owner may have been given to
understand by the trustee in bankruptcy
that no rent would, in fact, be payable
during the relevant period of occupation.
Alternatively, the co-owner in occupa-
tion may have no knowledge (or no
means of discovering) the other co-
owner’s bankruptcy. Short of such
circumstances, however, Blackburne J
was of the view that there is no reason
why the occupying owner should not be
charged an occupation rent.
Conclusions
In Stack Baroness Hale opined that the
statutory powers under the 1996 Act had
now replaced the doctrine of equitable
accounting. In her view: 
… the criteria laid down in the statute
should be applied, rather than in cases
decided under the old law.
In French, however, Blackburne J was
keen to emphasise that these remarks
had been made in the specific context of
a case where both parties had a right of
occupation of the family home. They
did not, therefore, govern the situation
where (as in French) one of the parties
had no statutory right of occupation.
Similarly, in Blackburne J’s view, Lord
Neuberger in Stack had been equally
careful to emphasise that the statutory
jurisdiction applies only where the co-
owner claiming the occupation rent has
been excluded from the property that
they would otherwise be entitled to
occupy. There is, therefore, no inconsis-
tency in these decisions.
• The Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 does not provide an
exhaustive code for claiming an occupation rent against an occupying co-owner of land.
• Although a trustee in bankruptcy cannot establish such a claim under the 1996 Act, this did
not preclude them from seeking an occupational rent under the court’s equitable jurisdiction.
• If it is not reasonable to expect the trustee to exercise a right of occupation, it will be
fair to charge the occupying co-owner an occupation rent.
Key points
Statutory jurisdiction applies only where the co-owner
claiming occupation rent is excluded from a property
that they would otherwise be entitled to occupy. 
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